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Abstract 
 
In a much anticipated judgment, the Federal Circuit has sought to clarify the standards 
applicable in determining whether a claimed method constitutes patent-eligible 
subject matter. 
 
In Bilski, the Federal Circuit identified a test to determine whether a patentee has 
made claims that pre-empt the use of a fundamental principle or an abstract idea or 
whether those claims cover only a particular application of a fundamental principle or 
abstract idea. It held that the sole test for determining subject matter eligibility for a 
claimed process under § 101 is that: (1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, 
or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing. The court termed 
this the “machine-or-transformation test.” In so doing it overruled its earlier State 
Street decision to the extent that it deemed its “useful, tangible and concrete result” 
test as inadequate to determine whether an alleged invention recites patent-eligible 
subject matter. 
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L.L.M. Queensland University of Technology; Lecturer in Law, Law School, Queensland University of 
Technology, Australia. 
 2
The Federal Circuit affirmed the finding of the Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences below that Bilski’s claimed invention, a method of hedging risk, does 
not satisfy the patentable subject matter requirements of 35 USC § 101 on the grounds 
that the claim does not satisfy the machine-or-transformation test. 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
In re Bilski1 came before the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit on 
appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark Office Board of Patent Appeals 
and Interferences. Bernard L Bilski and Rand A Warsaw (“Bilski”) had sought a 
patent for a method for managing (or hedging) the consumption risks associated with 
selling a commodity at a fixed price. Bilski’s patent contained a number of claims, but 
the court focused on the first of those claims, regarding it a representative of all 
claims made in the application.2  
 
The court gave an example of a method of hedging commodities trading risk, which is 
reproduced here to explain the nature of the invention claimed. 
                                                 
1 In re Bernard L Bilski and Rand A Warsaw, No. 2007-1130, 545 F.3d 943, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 
22479 (Fed. Cir. Oct 31, 2008) (en banc) (“In re Bilski”). The matter was heard before Chief Judge 
Michel, and Circuit Judges Newman, Mayer, Lourie, Rader, Schall, Bryson, Gajarsa, Linn, Dyk, Prost, 
and Moore. Chief Judge Michel wrote on behalf of the majority, in which Circuit Judges Lourie, 
Schall, Bryson, Gajarsa, Linn, Dyk, Prost, and Moore joined. A concurring opinion was filed by Circuit 
Judge Dyk, in which Circuit Judge Linn joined, addressing some of the issues raised in the dissenting 
opinions. Circuit Judges Newman, Mayer and Rader filed dissenting opinions. Of the three dissenting 
opinions, only Judge Newman found patentable subject matter in Bilski’s claims. 
2 The application, filed in 1997, contains eleven claims. Claim 1 reads:  
A method for managing the consumption risk costs of a commodity sold by a commodity provider at a 
fixed price comprising the steps of:  
(a) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider and consumers of said 
commodity wherein said consumers purchase said commodity at a fixed rate based upon 
historical averages, said fixed rate corresponding to a risk position of said consumer;  
(b) identifying market participants for said commodity having a counter-risk position to said 
consumers; and  
(c) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider and said market 
participants at a second fixed rate such that said series of market participant transactions 
balances the risk position of said series of consumer transactions. 
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[C]oal power plants (i.e., the “consumers”) purchase coal to produce 
electricity and are averse to the risk of a spike in demand for coal since such a 
spike would increase the price and their costs. Conversely, coal mining 
companies (i.e., the “market participants”) are averse to the risk of a sudden 
drop in demand for coal since such a drop would reduce their sales and 
depress prices. The claimed method envisions an intermediary, the 
“commodity provider,” that sells coal to the power plants at a fixed price, thus 
isolating the power plants from the possibility of a spike in demand increasing 
the price of coal above the fixed price. The same provider buys coal from 
mining companies at a second fixed price, thereby isolating the mining 
companies from the possibility that a drop in demand would lower prices 
below that fixed price. And the provider has thus hedged its risk; if demand 
and prices skyrocket, it has sold coal at a disadvantageous price but has 
bought coal at an advantageous price, and vice versa if demand and prices fall.  
Importantly, however, the claim is not limited to transactions involving actual 
commodities, and the application discloses that the recited transactions may 
simply involve options, i.e., rights to purchase or sell the commodity at a 
particular price within a particular timeframe.3 
 
This is not the sort of “invention” that has been traditionally been recognized as being 
patentable subject matter. Bilski’s claim 1 is not tied to any particular form of 
technology. It describes a non-machine-implemented method. Claim 1 does not recite 
how the steps of the method are implemented and is broad enough to read on 
                                                 
3 In re Bilski, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 22479 at *11-12. 
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performing the steps without any machine or apparatus. No hardware is required to 
perform the method, although performing the steps on a machine would infringe. It is 
not tied expressly or impliedly to any physical subject matter, tangible or intangible. 
Specifically, claim 1 does not involve a transformation of physical subject matter or 
any electrical, chemical, or mechanical act and the method could be performed 
entirely by a human being. Claim 1 does not directly transform data by a 
mathematical or non-mathematical algorithm. Lastly, it does not involve making or 
using a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter. 
 
At issue in Bilski was whether the claimed invention is patent eligible. The Federal 
Circuit held that it is not, affirming the finding of the Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences below. The court was not unanimous in its decision. However, between 
the majority and dissenting judgments we see three completely different, but 
seemingly plausible and defensible approaches to addressing the question before the 
court. This article will address those approaches. Part II of the article will examine the 
court’s decision and the majority judges’ reasons for that decision. In Part III it is 
argued that the court’s decision was incorrect as a matter of law. In Part IV the views 
of the dissenting judges are examined. Part V asks what the future will bring after this 
decision, while Part VI concludes that In re Bilski is an excellent candidate for 
Supreme Court judicial review. 
 
II THE COURT’S DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION 
 
A The Majority’s Machine-or-Transformation Test 
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The majority saw the issue before it being whether the applicants’ claims recite a 
fundamental principle and, if so, whether the application would substantially pre-empt 
all uses of that fundamental principle if allowed.4 
 
The approach undertaken by the majority was to attempt to resolve the issue purely by 
applying existing Supreme Court precedent. It did not attempt any policy-based 
analysis, seemingly on the belief that policy issues lie within the domain of the 
legislature and are already enshrined in the legislation as interpreted by that Supreme 
Court precedent.  
 
It interpreted that Supreme Court precedent as laying down a definitive test to 
determine whether a process claim encompasses only a particular application of a 
fundamental principle, which is patent-eligible, rather than pre-empting the principle 
itself, which is strictly unpatentable. According to the majority, a process is surely 
patent-eligible under § 101 if:  
 
(1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a 
particular article into a different state or thing.5  
 
Thus, the court was of the opinion that it is embodiment in a particular machine or 
apparatus, or physical transformation of subject matter, that distinguishes principles in 
the abstract from patent-eligible subject matter. The court termed this the “machine-
or-transformation test.” It held that this is the sole test for subject matter eligibility for 
a claimed process. 
                                                 
4 Id. at *23. 
5 Id. at *24. 
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However, while it regarded the machine-or-transformation test as the “sole” test for 
subject matter eligibility, the court also thought that the test could be displaced in 
appropriate circumstances, should it, or the Supreme Court think it appropriate to do 
so. In effect, the court is saying that machine-or-transformation test is the sole test for 
now. In reality, it would appear that the test is in fact that a claimed process must 
either be tied to a machine or apparatus or transform a particular article into a 
different state or thing, unless it is process without physical constraints that is 
otherwise a permissible practical application of a principle or idea and does not pre-
empt a fundamental principle of nature or abstract idea. The court’s rationale for 
providing this lifeline is that the law requires there be a physical transformation test 
for now, but that this may change in the future if new technologies demand it. In this 
sense, the court is hedging its bets, given that it is possible that some future 
unforeseen technology might arise and expose the machine-or-transformation test as 
being inadequate. 
 
Nevertheless, we agree that future developments in technology and the 
sciences may present difficult challenges to the machine-or-transformation 
test, just as the widespread use of computers and the advent of the Internet has 
begun to challenge it in the past decade. Thus, we recognize that the Supreme 
Court may ultimately decide to alter or perhaps even set aside this test to 
accommodate emerging technologies. And we certainly do not rule out the 
possibility that this court may in the future refine or augment the test or how it 
is applied. At present, however, and certainly for the present case, we see no 
need for such a departure and reaffirm that the machine-or-transformation test, 
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properly applied, is the governing test for determining patent eligibility of a 
process under § 101.6 
 
The court was cognizant of what it described as corollaries of the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Parker v Flook and Diamond v Diehr that mere field-of-use limitations 
are generally insufficient to render an otherwise ineligible process claim patent-
eligible and that “insignificant post-solution activity will not transform an 
unpatentable principle into a patentable process.”7 It claimed its machine-or-
transformation test to be consistent with these. 
 
In contrast, a claim that is tied to a particular machine or brings about a 
particular transformation of a particular article does not pre-empt all uses of a 
fundamental principle in any field but rather is limited to a particular use, a 
specific application. Therefore, it is not drawn to the principle in the 
abstract… [and that] even if a claim recites a specific machine or a particular 
transformation of a specific article, the recited machine or transformation must 
not constitute mere “insignificant post solution activity.”8 
 
B The Majority’s Rationale for the Machine-or-Transformation Test 
 
The Patent Act contains a broad definition of patent-eligible subject matter in 35 USC 
§ 101 entitled, “inventions patentable.” 
 
                                                 
6 Id, at *30-31. 
7 Diamond v Diehr, 450 US 175, 191-192 (1981). 
8 In re Bilski, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 22479 at *33. 
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Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and 
requirements of this title. 
 
Contained in this provision are four categories of statutory subject matter:  processes, 
machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter. The four categories of § 101 
statutory subject matter act as a threshold test or gateway through which an alleged 
invention must pass before the other requirements of patentability such as novelty, 
non-obviousness and utility need be assessed.9 The statutory categories of subject 
matter are stated broadly.10 It has been said that patentable subject matter comprises 
“anything under the sun that is made by man.”11  
 
The Patent Act also contains a definition of “process,” the only one of the four 
categories of § 101 statutory subject matter that has been defined in the legislation. 
“Process,” is defined in 35 USC § 100(b) as follows. 
 
The term “process” means process, art or method, and includes a new use of a 
known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material. 
 
The 1952 Patent Act replaced the word “art” used in § 101 in prior statutes with the 
word “process,” while the rest of § 101 was unchanged.12 At this time the “process” 
                                                 
9 Diehr, 450 US at 188. 
10 According to the Supreme Court in Diamond v Chakrabarty, 447 US 303, 308 (1980), the Act 
embodied Jefferson’s philosophy that “ingenuity should receive a liberal encouragement.” 
11 Chakrabarty, 447 US at 308-309. 
12 The Patent Act of 1793 originally used the term “art” rather than “process.” This change occurred 
when Congress enacted the current version of § 101 in 1952. The Supreme Court has held that this 
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definition was inserted in the Patent Act. The apparently circular definition of 
“process” to mean “process, art or method” makes it clear that the terms process, art 
and method are synonymous. That definition incorporates the prior usage of the term, 
“art” and the term, “method,” and places no restriction on the definition. 
 
No explicit exclusions follow the broad language of § 101. However, while the courts 
have been keen to interpret the four categories of patentable subject matter broadly,13 
the Supreme Court has identified general categories of non-patentable subject matter, 
namely a discovery of the laws or principles of nature, abstract ideas and naturally 
occurring phenomena because they do not fit the notion of ‘made by man.’14 These 
fundamental principles cannot be lawfully privatized because they lie within the 
public domain and are “part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men... free to all 
men and reserved exclusively to none.”15 In Gottschalk v Benson, it was said that, 
“[p]henomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract 
intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and 
technological work.”16 
 
While a claim to a fundamental principle is unpatentable, “an application of a law of 
nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be 
                                                                                                                                            
change did not alter the scope of patent eligibility over methods because “[i]n the language of the 
patent law, [a process] is an art.”: Diehr, 450 US at 182-84 quoting Cochrane v Deener, 94 US 780, 
787-88 (1877). 
13 Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 Act inform us that Congress intended statutory subject 
matter to ‘include anything under the sun that is made by man.’ S. Rep. No.1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 
5 (1952); H.R.Rep. No.1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1952) cited with approval in Chakrabarty, 447 
US at 309 and Diehr, 450 US at 182. 
14 Chakrabarty, 447 US at 309; Diehr, 450 US at 185 citing Parker v Flook, 437 US 584, 589 (1978) 
and Gottschalk v Benson, 409 US 63, 67 (1972). 
15 Funk Bros Seed Co v Kalo Inoculant Co, 333 US 127, 130 (1948). 
16 Benson, 409 US at 67. See also In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1378-1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding 
that “mental processes”, “processes of human thinking”, and “systems that depend for their operation 
on human intelligence alone” are not patent-eligible subject matter according to the Supreme Court’s 
finding in Benson). 
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deserving of patent protection.”17 Therefore, there is a distinction made between 
claims that “seek to pre-empt the use of” a fundamental principle, on the one hand, 
and claims that seek only to foreclose others from using a particular “application” of 
that fundamental principle, on the other.18 
 
Against this background, the majority explained its new machine-or-transformation 
test as having been mandated by the Supreme Court.19 The Federal Circuit’s majority 
pointed to the Supreme Court’s Cochrane v Deener decision, which placed a limit on 
the law’s acceptance of what is a patentable process, when it said the following. 
 
A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. 
It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject matter to be 
transformed and reduced to a different state or thing.20 
 
                                                 
17 Diehr, 450 US at 187 (emphasis in original). See also Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co v Radio Corp 
of America, 306 US 86, 94 (1939) (“While a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not 
a patentable invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge and scientific 
truth may be.”). 
18 Id. 
19 In re Bilski, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 22479 at *23-24. 
20 Cochrane v Deener, 94 US 780, 788 (1876). Cochrane v Deener involved a process for processing 
flour to improve its quality. The question before the Court was whether the patented process would be 
infringed if the steps were performed using different machinery. The court held that the process would 
be infringed if all its steps were followed, regardless of the form of machinery used. The quote relied 
upon by the Benson court reads in full: “That a process may be patentable, irrespective of the particular 
form of the instrumentalities used, cannot be disputed. If one of the steps of a process be that a certain 
substance is to be reduced to a powder, it may not be at all material what instrument or machinery is 
used to effect that object, whether a hammer, a pestle and mortar, or a mill. Either may be pointed out; 
but if the patent is not confined to that particular tool or machine, the use of the others would be an 
infringement, the general process being the same. A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials 
to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject matter to be 
transformed and reduced to a different state or thing. If new and useful, it is just as patentable as is a 
piece of machinery. In the language of the patent law, it is an art. The machinery pointed out as suitable 
to perform the process may or may not be new or patentable; whilst the process itself may be altogether 
new, and produce an entirely new result. The process requires that certain things should be done with 
certain substances, and in a certain order; but the tools to be used in doing this may be of secondary 
consequence.” 
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The majority cited more recent support for this interpretation in Gottschalk v Benson, 
claiming that the Benson court adopted the approach taken in Cochrane v Deener, 
when it quoted the statement reproduced above,21 before holding that transformation 
is “the clue” to the patentability of a process claim. 
 
Transformation and reduction of an article “to a different state or thing” is the 
clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not include particular 
machines.22 
 
The majority also relied on Parker v Flook, in which the Supreme Court recognized 
that: 
 
An argument can be made [that the Supreme] Court has only recognized a 
process as within the statutory definition when it either was tied to a particular 
apparatus or operated to change materials to a “different state or thing”.23 
 
Finally, the majority pointed to Diamond v Diehr, which it claimed applied the 
machine-or-transformation test to hold that use of a mathematical formula in a 
process “transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing” constitutes 
patent-eligible subject matter.24 
 
                                                 
21 Benson, 409 US at 70 quoting Cochrane, 94 US at 788. 
22 Id. (note that the court says that “transformation… is the clue,” not “transformation… is a clue.” 
(emphasis added)). The majority in Bilski was of the opinion that this wording indicates that the 
machine-or-implementation test is mandatory, not optional or merely advisory. See In re Bilski, 2008 
U.S. App. LEXIS 22479 at *29 n.11. 
23 Parker v Flook, 437 US 584, 589 n.9 (1978). 
24 Diamond v Diehr, 450 US 175, 192 (1981). 
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The majority conceded that it appears the Benson court was initially equivocal when 
putting forward this test, which might have been to suggest that the test was not the 
sole yardstick of patentability. 
 
It is argued that a process patent must either be tied to a particular machine or 
apparatus or must operate to change articles or materials to a “different state or 
thing.” We do not hold that no process patent could ever qualify if it did not 
meet the requirements of our prior precedents.25 
  
However, it wiped away all concerns that its new machine-or-transformation test 
might not be the only applicable test by finding that as the Supreme Court in the later 
decision in Diamond v Diehr had not repeated this “equivocation” it did not intend it 
to have any continuing effect. There the court said only that: 
 
Transformation and reduction of an article “to a different state or thing” is the 
clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not include particular 
machines.26 
 
The majority also claimed that the Supreme Court’s earlier decisions, O’Reilly v 
Morse,27 Cochrane v Deener, and Tilghman v Proctor28 are consistent with the 
machine-or-transformation test.29  
                                                 
25 Benson, 409 US at 71. In Flook, 437 US at 589 n.9, the Court took note that this statement had been 
made in Benson but merely stated, “As in Benson, we assume that a valid process patent may issue 
even if it does not meet [the machine-or-transformation test].” 
26 In re Bilski, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 22479 at *30 citing Diehr, 450 US at 184 which in turn cited 
Benson, 409 US at 70. 
27 56 US 62 (1854). 
28 102 US 707 (1880). 
29 In re Bilski, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 22479 at *27. 
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C The Court Rejected the “Useful, Concrete, and Tangible Result” Test 
 
In State Street, the Federal Circuit declared that the test for patentable subject matter 
is that an invention produce a “useful, concrete and tangible result.”30 The court 
famously said: 
 
Today, we hold that the transformation of data, representing discrete dollar 
amounts, by a machine through a series of mathematical calculations into a 
final share price, constitutes a practical application of a mathematical 
algorithm, formula, or calculation, because it produces “a useful, concrete and 
tangible result” -- a final share price momentarily fixed for recording and 
reporting purposes and even accepted and relied upon by regulatory 
authorities and in subsequent trades.31 
 
In Bilski, the Federal Circuit did an “about face,” overturning this declaration, finding 
the State Street formula “insufficient to determine whether a claim is patent-eligible 
under § 101.”32 
 
To be sure, a process tied to a particular machine, or transforming or reducing 
a particular article into a different state or thing, will generally produce a 
“concrete” and “tangible” result as those terms were used in our prior 
decisions. But while looking for “a useful, concrete and tangible result” may 
                                                 
30 State Street Bank & Trust Co. v Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (endorsed in AT&T Corp. v Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
31 Id. 
32 In re Bilski, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 22479 at *40. 
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in many instances provide useful indications of whether a claim is drawn to a 
fundamental principle or a practical application of such a principle, that 
inquiry is insufficient to determine whether a claim is patent-eligible under § 
101. And it was certainly never intended to supplant the Supreme Court’s test.  
Therefore, we also conclude that the “useful, concrete and tangible result” 
inquiry is inadequate and reaffirm that the machine-or-transformation test 
outlined by the Supreme Court is the proper test to apply.33 
 
In a footnote the court said that, “[a]s a result, those portions of our opinions in State 
Street and AT&T relying solely on a “useful, concrete and tangible result” analysis 
should no longer be relied on.”34 The Federal Circuit left the validity of the State 
Street patent unresolved according to the new test. We do not know whether the 
claimed invention in State Street would be patentable under the new test. 
 
The majority also confirmed that the Freeman-Walter-Abele test is inadequate to 
determine patent-eligibility under § 101.35 
 
D The Court Rejected the Adoption of a “Technological Arts” Test 
 
The court rejected the adoption of a “technological arts” test on the basis that such a 
test could not be clearly defined. 
 
                                                 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at *40-41 n.19. 
35 Id. at *38. The Federal Circuit had abandoned the Freeman-Walter-Abele test in the State Street 
decision in 1994, see State Street 49 F.3d at 1374 (‘after Diehr and Chakrabarty, the Freeman-Walter-
Abele test has little, if any, applicability to determining the presence of statutory subject matter.’). 
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We perceive that the contours of such a test, however, would be unclear 
because the meanings of the terms “technological arts” and “technology” are 
both ambiguous and ever-changing. And no such test has ever been explicitly 
adopted by the Supreme Court, this court, or our predecessor court, as the 
Board correctly observed here. Therefore, we decline to do so and continue to 
rely on the machine-or-transformation test as articulated by the Supreme 
Court.36 
 
The court did not consider that its machine-or-transformation test amounts to a 
“technological arts” test.37 
 
E No Category-Based Exclusions 
 
Further, the court rejected calls for categorical exclusions beyond those for 
fundamental principles already identified by the Supreme Court. 
 
On this basis the court affirmed its decision to refuse to recognize a business method 
exception in State Street and said that business methods and software may still be 
patentable. 
 
We rejected just such an exclusion in State Street, noting that the so-called 
“business method exception” was unlawful and that business method claims 
(and indeed all process claims) are “subject to the same legal requirements for 
                                                 
36 Id. at *41. 
37 Id. at *55. 
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patentability as applied to any other process or method.” 149 F.3d at 1375-76.  
We reaffirm this conclusion.38 
 
The Court also declined to adopt a broad exclusion over software or any other such 
category of subject matter beyond the exclusion of claims drawn to fundamental 
principles set forth by the Supreme Court.39 
 
F “Physical Steps” Alone are Not Sufficient 
 
The majority clarified that its machine-or-transformation test is not a requirement that 
a process disclose “physical steps” by referring to its earlier decision, In re Comiskey. 
A claim that recites physical steps but neither recites a particular machine or 
apparatus, nor transforms an article into a different state or thing, is not patent-
eligible. As such, a process in which every step can be performed entirely in the 
human mind would not be patentable. The court claimed to have criticized using a 
“physical steps” test in AT&T Corp., Inc. v Excel Communications, Inc.40 
 
G What Type of Machine or “Physical Transformation” is Required? 
 
The court did not explain what it meant by its reference to a “particular machine.” A 
question will remain as to whether a general purpose computer will qualify as a 
“particular machine.” 
 
                                                 
38 Id. at *42. 
39 Id. at *42-43 n.23. 
40 Id. at *44-45 citing AT&T Corp. v Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 
1999). 
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We leave to future cases the elaboration of the precise contours of machine 
implementation, as well as the answers to particular questions, such as 
whether or when recitation of a computer suffices to tie a process claim to a 
particular machine.41 
 
In relation to the requirement that a process must transform an article into a different 
state or thing, the court did not give much detail that would explain what sorts of 
“transformations” or “articles” will satisfy its test, other than to say “transformation 
must be central to the purpose of the claimed process.”42 
 
The court explained that the types of physical transformation permitted are those of 
“physical objects or substances” and those “representative of physical objects or 
substances” and would include an “an electronic signal representative of any physical 
object or substance.”43 In particular, the court made clear by referring to In re Abele, 
that the transformation of that raw data, representing some physical and tangible 
article, into a particular visual depiction of a physical object on a visual display is 
sufficient to constitute patentable subject matter. The claim was not required to 
involve any transformation of the underlying physical object that the data 
represented.44  
 
                                                 
41 Id. at *47 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at *52-53. 
44 Id. at *49. 
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However, the court was clear in stating that mere data gathering steps would not be 
sufficient to transform an unpatentable process into patentable subject matter, 
describing these as insignificant extra-solution activity.45 
 
H The Court’s Decision: Rejection of Bilski’s Claims 
 
The Federal Circuit rejected the applicants’ claimed process on the grounds that it 
does not satisfy the court’s machine-or-transformation test. The court made clear that 
“transforming” the relationships between people would not pass muster. 
 
Purported transformations or manipulations simply of public or private legal 
obligations or relationships, business risks, or other such abstractions cannot 
meet the test because they are not physical objects or substances, and they are 
not representative of physical objects or substances.46 
 
The court said that it is not enough to say that a claimed process produces “useful, 
concrete and tangible results” because as already discussed, this is insufficient to 
establish patent-eligibility under § 101.47 
 
Instead, the majority declared that allowing the Bilski claims, “would effectively pre-
empt any application of the fundamental concept of hedging and mathematical 
calculations inherent in hedging (not even limited to any particular mathematical 
                                                 
45 Id. at *50-51 citing and referring to In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989), In re Meyer, 688 
F.2d 789 (C.C.P.A. 1982) and In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
46 Id. at *52-53. 
47 Id. at *53-54. 
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formula).”48 Therefore, as the claims did not satisfy what the majority declare to be 
the applicable test to determine whether a claim is drawn to a patent-eligible process 
under § 101 set forth by the Supreme Court, the decision of the Board of Patent 
Appeals and Interferences was affirmed and Bilski’s claims were held not to have 
been directed to statutory subject matter.49 
 
I What the Majority Did Not Consider 
 
The Federal Circuit majority did not consider, to any great extent, policy issues to 
determine whether the sort of innovation claim by Bilski is consistent with the aims 
and justifications of patent law. 
 
Dyk J (supported by Linn J) undertook to remedy this in his concurring 
supplementary opinion by attempting to demonstrate that Bilski’s claims are not 
consistent with the types of claims historically recognized by the patent system. He 
stated that the method sought by Bilski would not have been considered patentable 
subject matter in England prior to 1793 as a “manufacture” within the meaning 
accorded to that term by the Statute of Monopolies. He also argued that the history of 
§ 101 supports the majority’s holding that Bilski’s claim does not recite patentable 
subject matter.  
 
III WHY THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT GOT IT WRONG 
 
                                                 
48 Id. at *59. 
49 Id. at *60. 
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The errors in the majority’s reasoning have been exposed in the opinion of Judge 
Newman. 
 
In Her Honor’s opinion, neither the text of § 101 nor the Supreme Court’s precedents 
support the view that a process must transform or reduce an article to a different state 
or thing. Her Honor supports this view by arguing that the quote from Cochrane v 
Deener so heavily relied upon in the Supreme Court’s trilogy of algorithm cases 
merely illustrates one type of statutory process that would be patentable. She says that 
the Supreme Court in those cases was adamant in its decision to not allow the law to 
freeze process patents to old technologies, leaving no room for new technologies, as 
mandating a physical transformation would do. She claimed that the Supreme Court 
in Gottschalk v Benson explicitly rejected the argument that a “process patent must 
either be tied to a particular machine or apparatus or must operate to change articles 
or materials to a ‘different state or thing.’” Instead, her opinion is that the Benson 
court regarded this only as one instance, or an example, of patent-eligible subject 
matter, a position she holds as having been followed in Parker v Flook and Diamond 
v Diehr.50 
 
That Her Honor is correct can be observed from a more complete reading of the 
Supreme Court cases the majority pins its reasoning to. Indeed, it can be said that the 
majority mistook to the law by virtue of the selective references it make to the texts of 
those decisions.  
 
                                                 
50 Id, at *96-108 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
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Her Honor explained that the Federal Circuit’s restrictive view of “processes” was in 
fact rejected in Gottschalk v Benson.51 The Supreme Court in Gottschalk v Benson 
recognized the accepted categories of excluded subject matter and explained that a 
mathematical formula unlimited to a specific use was simply an abstract idea.52 
However, contrary to the interpretation of the majority, Judge Newman found that the 
Court explicitly declined to limit patent-eligible processes when it stated that:  
 
It is argued that a process patent must either be tied to a particular machine or 
apparatus or must operate to change articles or materials to a “different state or 
thing.” We do not hold that no process patent could ever qualify if it did not 
meet the requirements of our prior precedents. It is said that the decision 
precludes a patent for any program servicing a computer. We do not so hold.53  
 
Judge Newman’s argument is that by saying, “[w]e do not hold that no process patent 
could ever qualify if it did not meet the requirements of our prior precedents,” the 
Supreme Court recognized that its earlier statement in Cochrane v Deener, that 
“[t]ransformation and reduction of an article “to a different state or thing” is the clue 
to the patentability of a process claim that does not include particular machines”, 
which was reproduced in Gottschalk v Benson,54 was made in the context of a 
mechanical process and a past era and should no longer be followed.55  
 
                                                 
51 Id. at *96-98. 
52 Gottschalk v Benson, 409 US 63, 67 (1972). 
53 Id. at 71 reproduced in In re Bilski, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 22479 at *96-97 (Newman, J., 
dissenting). 
54 Cochrane v Deener, 94 US 780, 788 (1876) cited in Benson, 409 US at 70. 
55 In re Bilski, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 22479 at *96-98 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
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Thus, the court in Benson made clear that it was not barring patents on computer 
programs and rejected the argument “that a process patent must either be tied to a 
particular machine or apparatus or must operate to change articles or materials to a 
‘different state or thing’” in order to satisfy § 101.56 
 
The Court recognized that it did not wish to perpetuate the position taken in Cochrane 
v Deener and unduly limit the scope of patentable subject matter by doing so. 
 
It is said we freeze process patents to old technologies, leaving no room for 
the revelations of the new, onrushing technology. Such is not our purpose.57 
 
Her Honor then pointed to Parker v Flook in which the court stated:  
 
The statutory definition of “process” is broad. An argument can be made, 
however, that this Court has only recognized a process as within the statutory 
definition when it either was tied to a particular apparatus or operated to 
change materials to a “different state or thing.” As in Benson, we assume that 
a valid process patent may issue even if it does not meet one of these 
qualifications of our earlier precedents.58 
 
This passage clearly indicates that the court in Flook intended to follow its previous 
decision in Benson. According to Her Honor, this statement “directly contravenes [the 
                                                 
56 Benson, 409 US at 71. 
57 Id. 
58 Parker v Flook, 437 US 584, 589 n.9 (1978) quoting Cochrane, 94 US at 788 quoted in In re Bilski, 
2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 22479 at *99 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
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Federal Circuit’s] new requirement that all processes must meet the court’s ‘machine-
or-transformation test’ or be barred from access to the patent system.”59 
 
Next, Judge Newman explained that in Diamond v Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court 
recognized that Congress’s use of the word, “any” in §101 (“Whoever invents or 
discovers any new and useful process...”) allows for the patentability of “any” 
process, not just processes that are limited to the physical constraints of machines or 
physical transformation of subject matter.60 In doing so, Judge Newman noted that the 
court identified the legislative intent as being to include within the scope of § 101 
“anything under the sun that is made by man.”61 
 
Finally, Her Honor noted that in Diamond v Diehr the Supreme Court directly held 
that computer-implemented processes are patentable subject matter. She refuted the 
majority’s assertion that in Diamond v Diehr the Supreme Court had regarded the 
machine-or-transformation test as a recognized category of excluded subject matter.62  
 
Instead she found that the court had only identified one example of circumstance in 
which an invention will be patent-eligible. The essence of the statement made in 
Gottschalk v Benson which indicated that a process might not require a physical 
transformation was repeated in Diamond v Diehr. 
 
On the other hand, when a claim containing a mathematical formula 
implements or applies that formula in a structure or process which, when 
                                                 
59 In re Bilski, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 22479 at *100 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
60 Id. at *101-103 citing Diamond v Chakrabarty, 447 US 303, 308 (1980). 
61 Chakrabarty, 447 US at 309 citing S. Rep. 82-1979, at 5; H.R. Rep. 82-1923, at 6 (1952). 
62 In re Bilski, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 22479 at *103-108 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
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considered as a whole, is performing a function which the patent laws were 
designed to protect (e.g., transforming or reducing an article to a different state 
or thing), then the claim satisfies the requirements of § 101.63 
 
Once again, we see a reference to “transforming or reducing an article” only being 
made by way of example, indicated by the use of “e.g.” suggesting that physical 
transformation is simply one expression of patentable subject matter, rather than 
mandatory. 
 
Further, Judge Newman has pointed out that there was no issue in Diamond v Diehr 
of the need for either machine or transformation, “for both were undisputedly present 
in the process of curing rubber”, therefore any suggestion in Diamond v Diehr that the 
machine-or-transformation test is mandatory is strictly obiter dicta.64 
 
Her Honor was correct in recognizing, contrary to the majority’s finding, that in 
AT&T Corp v Excel Communications, Inc, the Federal Circuit had itself described 
physical transformation as “merely one example of how a mathematical algorithm 
may bring about a useful application.”65 There Plager J said: 
 
The notion of “physical transformation” can be misunderstood. In the first 
place, it is not an invariable requirement, but merely one example of how a 
mathematical algorithm may bring about a useful application. As the Supreme 
Court itself noted, “when [a claimed invention] is performing a function which 
the patent laws were designed to protect (e.g., transforming or reducing an 
                                                 
63 Diamond v Diehr, 450 US 175, 192 (1981). 
64 In re Bilski, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 22479 at *108 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
65 Id. at *114 citing AT&T Corp v Excel Communications, Inc, 172 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
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article to a different state or thing), then the claim satisfies the requirements of 
§ 101.”… The “e.g.” signal denotes an example, not an exclusive 
requirement.66 
 
Judge Newman also made the case that the earlier Supreme Court decisions, O’Reilly 
v Morse,67 Cochrane v Deener, and Tilghman v Proctor68 show that a process has 
never been tied to either apparatus or transformation, as the majority holds.69 
 
For instance, she identified that Cochrane v Deener, the case so heavily relied upon 
by the majority, is not even good authority to support the machine-or-transformation 
test. Citing In re Prater,70 Judge Newman noted that the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals observed:  
 
[This Cochrane passage] has sometimes been misconstrued as a “rule” or 
“definition” requiring that all processes, to be patentable, must operate 
physically on substances. Such a result misapprehends the nature of the 
passage quoted as dictum, in its context, and the question being discussed by 
the author of the opinion. To deduce such a rule from the statement would be 
contrary to its intendment which was not to limit process patentability but to 
point out that a process is not limited to the means used in performing it.71 
 
                                                 
66 AT&T, 172 F 3d at 1357-1358 quoting Diehr, 450 US at 192. 
67 56 US 62 (1854). 
68 102 US 707 (1880). 
69 In re Bilski, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 22479 at *109-115 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
70 415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969). 
71 In re Bilski, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 22479 at *114 (Newman, J., dissenting) citing Prater, 415 F.2d 
at 1403. 
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As such, her opinion is that the majority has redefined the “process” category in § 101 
to exclude all processes that do not transform physical matter or that are not 
performed by machines, a restriction that did not previously exist and one that is 
contrary to statute, Supreme Court precedent and the constitutional mandate.72  
 
Instead, Her Honor proposed that the approach to be taken to identify patentable 
subject matter is a simple one. It involves recognizing that the scope of patentable 
subject matter is broad and encompasses “anything under the sun that is made by 
man” other than the recognized exclusions: fundamental principles, laws of nature 
and abstract ideas. 
 
A straightforward, efficient, and ultimately fair approach to the evaluation of 
“new and useful” processes—quoting Section 101—is to recognize that a 
process invention that is not clearly a “fundamental truth, law of nature, or 
abstract idea” is eligible for examination for patentability.73 
 
It is clear from Her Honor’s dissenting judgment that the majority created a test that is 
inconsistent with existing Supreme Court precedent and wrongly relied on that test. 
Further, this finding also throws doubt on the validity of the Federal Circuit’s 
prohibition on processes that merely involve “physical steps.” 
 
IV THE DISSENTING JUDGES 
 
A Judge Newman 
                                                 
72 Id, at *91 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
73 Id, at *151-152. 
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In an opinion reminiscent of her vigorous dissent in Schrader, Judge Newman 
criticized the majority for rendering a decision that fails to keep up with changes in 
new technologies. As has already been discussed, Judge Newman was of the opinion 
that the majority’s machine-or-transformation test is not supported by the statutory 
language of § 101 and is inconsistent with existing Supreme Court precedent that the 
Federal Circuit is bound to follow. Instead, she is of the opinion that the only subject 
matter excluded from patent-eligibility are fundamental principles, laws of nature or 
abstract ideas,74 a view which precludes the court’s new machine-or-transformation 
test. 
 
Judge Newman was the only judge in Bilski who found that the claims recite statutory 
subject matter. She concluded that Bilski’s claim 1 is neither a fundamental truth nor 
an abstraction and as such the majority was wrong to deem it patent-ineligible. 
 
Bilski’s patent application describes his process of analyzing the effects of 
supply and demand on commodity prices and the use of a coupled transaction 
strategy to hedge against these risks; this is not a fundamental principle or an 
abstract idea; it is not a mental process or a law of nature.  It is a “process,” set 
out in successive steps, for obtaining and analyzing information and carrying 
out a series of commercial transactions for the purpose of “managing the 
consumption risk costs of a commodity sold by a commodity provider at a 
fixed price.” Claim 1, preamble. 
 
                                                 
74 Id. at *92-93. 
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Because the process Bilski describes employs complex mathematical 
calculations to assess various elements of risk, any practicable embodiment 
would be conducted with the aid of a machine—a programmed computer—but 
the court holds that since computer-implementation is not recited in claim 1, 
for that reason alone the process fails the “machine” part of the court’s 
machine-or-transformation test.  Maj. op. at 24.  And the court holds that since 
Bilski’s process involves the processing of data concerning commodity prices 
and supply and demand and other risk factors, the process fails the 
“transformation” test because no “physical objects or substances” are 
transformed.  Maj. op. at 28-29.  The court then concludes that because 
Bilski’s Claim 1 fails the machine-or-transformation test it ipso facto preempts 
a “fundamental principle” and is thereby barred from the patent system under 
Section 101: an illogical leap that displays the flaws in the court’s analysis.75 
 
Instead, Her Honor suggested that if a claim is unduly broad, or if it fails to include 
sufficient specificity, the appropriate ground of rejection is § 112, which requires that 
claims particularly identify and distinctly claim the invention, rather than being 
outlawed under § 101.76 
 
Judge Newman also dissented from the majority’s decision to overrule the State Street 
“useful, concrete, and tangible result” test, arguing that the test should remain because 
the business community has grown to accept it and might be disadvantaged by the 
uncertainty that would ensue from its rejection.77 
 
                                                 
75 Id. at *148. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at *136. 
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She criticized the majority’s opinion in terms of its policy implications. She argued 
that the United States has benefited from having a stable system of law that values 
legal certainty and a patent system that has always recognized a broad scope of 
patentable subject matter, limited only by the requirements for patentability of Title 
35 that lie outside § 101. She maintained that the dual qualities of legal certainty and 
broad subject matter are essential to foster innovation, so the Federal Circuit should 
not change the law without due consideration; and in any event this is a change that 
should be left to Congress.78 
 
[T]he wider effect will be a disincentive to innovation-based commerce. For 
inventors, investors, competitors, and the public, the most grievous 
consequence is the effect on inventions not made or not developed because of 
uncertainty as to patent protection.79 
 
B Judge Mayer 
 
Judge Mayer argued in favor of a “technological arts” test limited to advances in 
science and technology and not permitting patents for business methods, which he 
saw as consistent with the historical purpose of the patent system. 
 
The patent system is intended to protect and promote advances in science and 
technology, not ideas about how to structure commercial transactions. … 
Affording patent protection to business methods lacks constitutional and 
                                                 
78 Id. at *142-146. 
79 Id. at *145-146. 
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statutory support, serves to hinder rather than promote innovation and usurps 
that which rightfully belongs in the public domain.80 
 
He focused heavily on the policy arguments that lie against allowing patents over 
business methods to support his holding that Bilski’s claims are not deserving of 
patent protection.  
 
His Honor found Bilski’s claims unpatentable because their innovative aspect is 
entrepreneurial rather than technological. This is an approach that might find favor 
with the Supreme Court if it were to take the matter on appeal and decide not to 
follow the majority’s reasoning. 
 
C Judge Rader 
 
Judge Rader wrote an eloquent and witty repudiation of the majority’s opinion that 
echoed Judge Newman’s analysis of the majority’s misreading of the statutory 
provision and Supreme Court precedent. He asked why the majority’s test is 
necessary when settled law already provides a framework for determining the 
patentability of Bilski’s claims.  
 
This court labors for page after page, paragraph after paragraph, explanation 
after explanation to say what could have been said in a single sentence: 
                                                 
80 Id. at *154 (Mayer, J., dissenting). 
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“Because Bilski claims merely an abstract idea, this court affirms the Board’s 
rejection.”81 
 
His Honor roundly criticized the majority. 
 
Much of the court’s difficulty lies in its reliance on dicta taken out of context 
from numerous Supreme Court opinions dealing with the technology of the 
past. In other words, as innovators seek the path to the next techno-revolution, 
this court ties our patent system to dicta from an industrial age decades 
removed from the bleeding edge.82 
 
Judge Rader’s opinion is compelling due to its simplicity and is an admirably concise 
summation of Supreme Court precedent, but contains one major flaw in its reasoning. 
It fails to explain why Bilski’s claim 1 is an abstract idea. Judge Rader makes an 
attempt to describe an abstract claim. 
 
Such an abstract claim would appear in a form that is not even susceptible to 
examination against prior art under the traditional tests for patentability. Thus 
this court would wish to ensure that the claim supplied some concrete, tangible 
technology for examination.83 
 
However, this is not much of a test. Judge Rader’s opinion is as helpful as saying, I 
know patentable subject matter when it see it. 
 
                                                 
81 Id. at *194 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at *201. 
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V LIFE AFTER BILSKI: WHERE TO NEXT? 
 
A What Will a Claimant Need to Prove to Establish the Patent-Eligibility of an 
Invention that Does Not Involve a “Machine-or-Transformation”? 
 
Given that the Federal Circuit’s decision in Bilski has not provided a reliable 
resolution of the question at issue, we still lack a clear statement of principle from that 
court which describes what a claimant will have to prove to establish the patent-
eligibility of an invention that does not involve a “machine-or-transformation.” 
 
As both Judges Newman and Rader made clear, all we have is guidance from the 
Supreme Court that any process is patentable subject matter provided that it does not 
claim a fundamental principle, a law of nature or an abstract principle, in addition to 
the warnings from Parker v Flook and Diamond v Diehr that insignificant post-
solution activity will not transform non-patent-eligible subject matter into patent-
eligible subject matter. 
 
As such, it is difficult to see where the dividing line between patentability and non-
patentability lies for these types of innovation. However, that difficulty is something 
we must come to accept. Maybe there is no convenient proxy test to substitute for the 
Supreme Court’s pronouncements. We need to accept that the concept of invention 
necessarily is slippery and has fuzzy borders. Invention and innovation are supposed 
to be excitingly unpredictable. In time the majority’s machine-or-transformation test 
will be discarded in the same way the “useful, concrete and tangible result” test was 
discarded as an inaccurate summation of patent-eligibility. The Supreme Court’s 
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pronouncement that patentable subject matter includes “anything under the sun that is 
made by man” that does not fall within the stated exceptions, a discovery of the laws 
or principles of nature, abstract ideas and naturally occurring phenomena is as much 
refinement as we are likely to get. 
 
The sort of non-machine implemented innovation we are seeing before the patent 
office must be addressed with two issues in mind. The first is a narrow black-letter 
interpretation of what was said by the Supreme Court in its trilogy of algorithm cases 
and Diamond v Chakrabarty in light of the statutory wording in set down in § 101. 
The difficulty with this is that unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not clearly 
express itself in the first case of the trilogy, Gottschalk v Benson, which is what 
brought the Federal Circuit unstuck. However, Judges Newman and Rader had given 
us clarity in that respect. The second is a broader inquiry into the policy implications 
of allowing the patent-eligibility of these sorts of innovation and whether they are 
consistent the purpose of the Constitutional mandate to foster the “useful arts” or the 
“technological arts.” 
 
This approach of course leaves unanswered some of the questions the Federal Circuit 
expressed in oral arguments that it hoped to resolve in Bilski. These include, whether 
a transformation of someone’s spine in a chiropractic treatment is sufficient to attract 
patent-eligibility, whether a sporting maneuver, such as the action of causing a fumble 
(in gridiron) or throwing a curveball (in baseball) is sufficient, or whether mere 
communication of information between people or a change in the relationships 
between people is a sufficient real world effect (say where a patent application claims 
a process of using mandatory arbitration to resolve disputes affecting wills and 
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contracts, as was the case in In re Comiskey). Alas, these are questions for another 
day. 
 
In practice, patent attorneys will attempt to avoid these difficulties wherever possible 
by adding some sort of physical element to what otherwise might be deemed abstract 
claims. This would be done to give them some material form in an attempt to pass an 
unpatentable abstract idea off as a patentable invention. This is a risky strategy given 
the courts’ aversion to insignificant post-solution (or if you prefer, extra-solution) 
activity. The court in Parker v Flook made clear that adding “insignificant post-
solution activity” to otherwise unpatentable subject matter will not make that subject 
matter patentable.84 In essence, the principle requires that the invention, being the 
advance over the prior art made by the inventor, be identified and extracted from any 
extraneous material contained in the description of the invention or claims that would 
otherwise confuse the reader as to the true scope of the inventor’s contribution to the 
state of the art. Secondly, such an addition might render the patent easy to invent 
around by utilizing some other form of physical appendage (thus allowing for the 
taking of the essence of the innovation without infringing the claims). 
 
B The Federal Circuit’s Rejection of the State Street Test 
 
The Federal Circuit’s rejection of the State Street “useful, concrete, and tangible 
result” test will not have the drastic effect of eliminating business methods as a class 
from patentability. Business methods that, irrespective of the fact that they can be 
                                                 
84 Parker v Flook, 437 US 584, 590 (1978). 
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classified as such, would remain patentable subject matter.85 Instead, this admirable 
“about face” by the court will reduce uncertainty and complexity by removing this 
inaccurate proxy test. 
 
Judge Newman’s argument that the State Street “useful, concrete, and tangible result” 
test should not be overruled because the business community has grown to accept it 
and might be disadvantaged by the uncertainty that would ensue from its rejection is 
not one that should be embraced. That the State Street test was bad law (or more 
correctly, an incorrect, vague, overly broad and possibly meaningless simplification 
of a necessarily complex legal principle) in the sense of being inconsistent with 
existing principle (as the majority correctly determined) requires that it be set aside. A 
legal system’s integrity is to be assessed according to its adherence to established 
fundamental principles, not its blind adherence to a strict application of stare decisis 
that perpetuates an error of law. 
 
VI CONCLUSION 
 
Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit’s machine-or-transformation test is not the panacea 
for the problem of patentability of purely intangible inventions that observers were 
hoping from the court and the court was hoping to provide. Rather, it would appear 
that Judge Newman got it right, showing us that the Supreme Court’s precedents still 
hold sway.  
 
                                                 
85 See for example Cincinnati Traction Co v Pope, 210 F. 443 (6th Cir. 1913) (A time-limited transfer 
ticket designed to prevent morning train riders from boarding the evening train without a valid ticket 
was deemed patentable as a “tool of business.”) 
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A straightforward, efficient, and ultimately fair approach to the evaluation of 
“new and useful” processes—quoting Section 101—is to recognize that a 
process invention that is not clearly a “fundamental truth, law of nature, or 
abstract idea” is eligible for examination for patentability.86 
 
There might certainly exist a class or classes of invention that satisfies this test that 
causes no physical transformation or discloses no physical steps. That possibility 
being open, it is folly to cordon it off and deem it as lying outside the patent system, 
given the existence of the Supreme Court’s broad and inclusive patentability 
standards. Having said that, though, the integrity of the patent system must be 
maintained and it should not be allowed to provide protection to advances that cannot 
be sensibly categorized as inventions, because to allow this would have dire effects on 
people’s ability to engage in a wide range of everyday domestic and business 
activities.87 
 
Given the errors identifiable in the court’s reasoning, Bilski is certainly a candidate 
for a grant of certiorari and to be heard on appeal by the Supreme Court. This is 
doubly so, as the Federal Circuit almost requested a review of its decision, stating that 
“we recognize that the Supreme Court may ultimately decide to alter or perhaps even 
set aside this test to accommodate emerging technologies.”88 
 
The Federal Circuit set down a reasonable test that has advantages as a yardstick (or 
clue) to determining the patent-eligibility of an alleged invention. However, the test 
                                                 
86 In re Bilski, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 22479 at *151-152 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
87 See, e.g., John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C L. Rev. 1139 (1999); 
John R. Thomas, Symposium: The Post-Industrial Patent System 10 (1999) Fordham Intell. Prop. 
Media & Ent. L.J. 3. 
88 In re Bilski, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 22479 at *31. 
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should not have been described as the sole test for assessing process claims. As Judge 
Newman correctly held, to say that this test is the sole determinant of patentable 
subject matter is contrary to statute, Supreme Court precedent and the constitutional 
mandate.89 Instead the majority should have described its machine-or-transformation 
test as being indicative of patent-eligibility. Had it done this it would have at least 
delivered a decision that was not inconsistent with the existing principles to which the 
court was bound. 
 
 
                                                 
89 Id. at *91 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
